Paper No. 4 — The Transition Problem
Why meaningful reform must operate within existing contracts, institutional constraints, and entrenched incentives—and how a new system can emerge despite them.
“A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”
— James Madison, Federalist No. 51
The case for reform is straightforward. The current system is unstable, the NCAA lacks the authority to govern it effectively, and both athletes and institutions would benefit from a more coherent structure.
The difficulty lies elsewhere.
Meaningful change must operate within a system defined not only by incentives and ideas, but by binding agreements, entrenched governance structures, and long-term economic commitments. For that reason, reform in college football will not arrive as a single event. It will emerge over time, and only as existing constraints allow.
This paper advances a central claim: the transition to a new system is constrained, but not prevented, by the contractual and institutional framework that currently governs the sport.
I. The Constraint of Existing Agreements
The central obstacle to reform is contractual.
Major college football is governed not only by rules, but by long-term media agreements, conference bylaws, and grant-of-rights provisions that bind institutions to their current structures. These agreements extend well into the next decade and, in some cases, beyond it.
The Big Ten’s current media deal runs through approximately 2030
The Big 12’s extends through 2031
The College Football Playoff agreement runs through 2032
The SEC’s deal extends into the mid-2030s
The ACC, through its grant of rights, is effectively bound through 2036 and beyond
These are not informal understandings or easily revised arrangements. They are enforceable contracts that allocate rights, obligations, and revenue streams across the system.
Any proposal for reform that does not account for these agreements is, as a practical matter, incomplete.
II. Grant of Rights and Institutional Lock-In
Among these arrangements, grant-of-rights provisions are particularly significant.
Under a grant-of-rights agreement, member institutions assign their media rights to the conference for the duration of the contract. A school that departs early does not take those rights with it. Instead, it forfeits them, often along with substantial associated revenue.
The effect is straightforward. Exit is possible, but costly.
In recent realignment cycles, institutions have demonstrated a willingness to incur those costs in order to accelerate movement. Even so, those decisions have required substantial financial concessions and have occurred only under specific circumstances.
Grant-of-rights provisions do not render change impossible. They do, however, ensure that change occurs deliberately, and often only when the economic calculus becomes unavoidable.
III. The Power Problem
Structural constraints extend beyond contracts.
Within existing conferences, governance is typically shared among member institutions. Voting power is not always aligned with competitive or economic position. As a result, institutions that might be disadvantaged by reform often retain the ability to delay or prevent it.
The practical consequence is that meaningful change cannot begin with exclusion. It must begin with alignment among institutions that remain bound together under current agreements.
This is not an accidental feature of the system. It reflects the way in which those agreements were constructed—through consensus, not hierarchy.
IV. Why the System Persists
The persistence of the current system is therefore not difficult to explain.
Institutions are bound by contracts that extend years into the future. Conferences operate through governance structures that require collective agreement. Media partners have secured long-term rights to a product defined by its existing form.
Each of these elements reinforces the others.
As a result, the system continues to operate even as its underlying assumptions have begun to erode. The gap between formal structure and practical reality widens, but the framework itself remains in place.
V. Points of Leverage
Change in a system of this kind rarely occurs continuously. It occurs at specific moments when constraints loosen and incentives align.
In college football, those moments are most likely to arise when:
Major media agreements approach expiration
The postseason structure is renegotiated
A subset of institutions reaches agreement on a new framework
Each of these events creates an opportunity for realignment—not merely of conferences, but of governance itself.
The College Football Playoff is particularly significant in this respect. As a national asset with independent governance, it offers a potential foundation for broader structural change. Adjustments to its format or administration may, in practice, precede and enable more comprehensive reform.
VI. An Incremental Transition
Given these constraints, the transition to a new system is best understood as incremental.
Initial coordination is likely to occur within existing frameworks, as institutions explore shared approaches to governance, compensation, and structure. Over time, as contracts expire and new agreements are negotiated, those efforts can be formalized and expanded.
This process does not produce a clean break from the current system. It produces a gradual shift, in which the underlying structure evolves as the constraints that support it weaken.
VII. Necessary Concessions
Transition also requires tradeoffs.
Institutions may be required to accept changes in revenue distribution or to operate within new governance structures. Conferences may be asked to cede certain forms of authority in exchange for continued relevance within a broader system.
Even the most successful programs are unlikely to preserve every existing advantage in a restructured environment.
Reform, in this sense, is not costless. It requires adjustment across the system.
VIII. The Cost of Inaction
The alternative to a managed transition is not stability.
Absent reform, the system will continue to evolve through litigation, regulatory pressure, and ad hoc decision-making. Rules will shift unevenly. Enforcement will remain inconsistent. Institutional control will erode incrementally rather than by design.
Change, in other words, will still occur. It will simply occur without coordination.
IX. The Transition Problem
The difficulty of reform is often cited as a reason to defer it. In practice, it is a reason to approach it deliberately.
Contracts will expire. Incentives will shift. Opportunities for coordination will arise.
The question is not whether the system will change, but whether that change will be structured and intentional, or imposed through external pressure.
X. Conclusion
College football cannot be reconstructed overnight, and no serious proposal should assume otherwise.
The system that exists today is the product of agreements and incentives that remain in force. As those agreements evolve, so too will the structure of the sport.
The task is to recognize that process and to shape it where possible.
Reform will not occur as a single act.
It will occur as a sequence of decisions, each constrained by the moment in which it is made.
The only question is whether those decisions are guided—or left to circumstance.